Photographs from Hokkaido & Kanagawa
工藤靖樹 / Yasuki Kudo is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Before joining UT Austin, he studied political science at universities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. From 2020 to 2024, he was a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Kentucky.
His research focuses on international security and cooperation. He uses quantitative methods to study military alliances, human rights, and public opinion. His work appears or is forthcoming in peer-reviewed journals, including International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Peace Research, and Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Interests
Military alliances
Arms transfers
Human rights
Public opinion
Education
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MA in Political Science, 2024
University of Kentucky -
MA in Political Science, 2020
Kobe University -
MA in International Relations, 2019
University of Essex -
BA in Law, 2017
Hokkaido University
Publications
Foreign Policy Alignment in Asymmetric Alliances
Major powers often form military alliances with much weaker partners. Scholars generally believe that these relationships allow major powers to advance their global policy priorities by securing policy alignment from their partners. However, we know little about how successful major powers are in achieving this goal, largely because measuring foreign policy alignment in asymmetric alliances has proven challenging. Major powers pursue alignment on a wide range of policy dimensions, and the degree of alignment provided by allies varies over time. To address these challenges, we develop a measurement model to estimate the policy alignment of US allies in the post-WWII period. Our approach produces a continuous measure of alignment with US foreign policy priorities for all states from 1950 to 2010. The resulting estimates indicate that allies tend to be more closely aligned with the US than non-allies, while also exhibiting substantial variation across alliances and allies over time. We also use the measure to examine the effect of US alliance commitments on alignment relative to other forms of US support, finding that the US alliance network plays a central role in shaping alignment. These findings provide new insights into the US alliance system and highlight the ability of major powers to advance their global policy priorities through alliance commitments to weaker states.
- Jesse C. Johnson , Yasuki Kudo & Andrew G. Long
- International Interactions, OnlineFirst
- May 2026
Misreading the public? Rethinking surveys in interstate disputes
Do surveys provide reliable information on public opinion in interstate disputes? Politicians and critics frequently rely on surveys to understand public policy preferences in disputes. We provide empirical evidence that casts doubt on the reliability of such surveys: respondents may falsify their preferences when they favor contentious approaches, such as aggressive military activities and concessions to adversaries. Concessions are often perceived as anti-societal, as they sacrifice national interests for the benefit of an adversary, while aggressive military options conflict with widely shared anti-war norms prevalent across many societies. These approaches are therefore deemed socially undesirable, and the members of society feel pressure to conform their expressed preferences accordingly, even in anonymous online settings. A list experiment evaluating Japanese voters’ opinions on the territorial dispute with China shows that the use of a direct question format underestimates support for territorial concessions and military base construction on the disputed territories by 16–20 percentage points compared to the list format. These findings carry important implications for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners. Democratic elites who rely on survey data to gauge public preferences may systematically misread their constituents, potentially missing both opportunities for peaceful resolution and risks of unexpected public support for escalation.
- Yasuki Kudo, Sohei Shigemura & Makito Takei
- Journal of Peace Research, OnlineFirst
- May 2026
Does the US Really Embolden its Allies? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Japan
Do patrons’ signals of security commitments embolden junior partners? The literature on military alliances suggests that this might be the case: supportive gestures by patrons could motivate junior partners to adopt more aggressive postures in their own disputes than they would without such support. While the theoretical logic is compelling when considering states as unitary actors, it is less clear if this logic applies to the domestic public that may have differing interests from leaders. To complement this gap, we conducted a survey experiment in Japan, a close US ally with a territorial dispute with China, to explore the impact of US presidential signals on public support for adopting aggressive policies towards China. We find that US signals increase the credibility of US military intervention in territorial disputes; however no evidence of an emboldenment effect is found—public support for escalatory policies does not increase accordingly. Additionally, we find that US signals do not encourage the public to punish leaders backing down after announcing aggressive policies. These findings challenge the conventional understanding of an important effect of alliance politics.
- Yasuki Kudo & Viet Hung Nguyen Cao
- Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 70, Issue 4
- April 2026
Rewarding Loyalty: Selective Reassurance and Enforcement of Asymmetric Alliances
Great powers frequently signal their alliance commitments during peacetime. While scholars see this peacetime practice as an integral part of great powers’ alliance maintenance, there is significant variation in the intensity of signals that junior allies receive. This article suggests that the choices made by great powers in signalling alliance commitments can be explained by the motivation to encourage compliance among junior allies. Great powers typically form alliances to exert control over their junior allies’ decision-making and thereby maintain their sphere of influence. Yet, great powers may face difficulty in making junior allies accommodate their demands as junior allies’ interests are not always in alignment. This article argues that great powers attempt to maintain their allies’ incentive to comply by reaffirming alliance commitments as an ex-post reward. In addition, to increase the efficiency of this reward strategy, great powers carefully select the targets, taking into account their allies’ willingness to make concessions. Empirical analysis using the sample of United States alliance relationships provides evidence that supports these arguments. This article contributes to the literature by deepening our comprehension of how great powers manage their alliances and providing at least a partial answer to how asymmetric alliances are maintained. Furthermore, this article has important implications for how great powers maintain their status within the international system.
- Yasuki Kudo
- Journal of Peace Research, Volume 62, Issue 6
- November 2025
A Forgotten Tie Between Democracies and Nondemocracies in Asymmetric Cooperation
Objectives. I examine the linkage between regime type and the durability of interstate cooperation. While scholars have argued that a pair of democracies is better than other combinations of regime types in achieving successful cooperation because of their accountable domestic institutions, I contend that less accountable institutions in nondemocracies can facilitate certain types of cooperation when states need to cede some autonomy to their cooperation partners. I expect that when cooperation necessitates multiple types of contributions, such as credible commitment and autonomy, a combination of mixed regimes can effectively achieve sustainable cooperation. Methods. My argument is examined in the context of asymmetric alliances, a form of cooperation characterized by the exchange of security and autonomy between a major power and a minor power. I use data on bilateral alliances from 1816 to 2001 for empirical analysis. Results. An asymmetric alliance formed between a democratic major power and a nondemocratic minor power is as durable as a joint democratic asymmetric alliance. Conclusions. My findings indicate that joint democracy is not always the best combination of regime types for interstate cooperation and that there are circumstances in which nondemocracies can facilitate cooperation.
- Yasuki Kudo
- Social Science Quarterly, Volume 106, Issue 2
- March 2025
Human Rights Promotion and Democratic Allies
Do military alliances promote human rights? Scholars and practitioners generally believe they do not because states form alliances largely to advance their strategic interests and thus are not interested in members’ domestic policies. I claim that some states may care about their allies’ human rights practices. Specifically, democracies are concerned that alliance relationships with rights-abusing governments harm their reputation, and thus urge their allies to improve human rights. However, this rights-promoting motivation is constrained because democracies also need to preserve alliance partnerships with governments that may rely on repression for their internal security. Empirical analyses of alliance relationships between democracies and autocracies provide support for this argument. Autocracies with a powerful democratic ally implement relatively advanced human rights protection; however, this association becomes weaker as the risk of domestic conflict becomes higher. These findings suggest the importance of considering democratic allies in the international promotion of human rights.
- Yasuki Kudo
- International Studies Quarterly, Volume 68, Issue 4
- December 2024
